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This report puts Ethiopia's population at 37.5 million in
1979 and 40.9 million in 1987. The Ethiopian government has estimated its 1987 population at 45.9 million,
a figure accepted as generally valid by the World Bank
and most other aid donors.
Faught, op cit., pp. iii/iv.
Henze, "~thiopia's Economic Prospects for the 1990s," p. 3.
International Labor Organization, Socialism from the
<?rass _Ro?ts,: Accumulation, Employment and Equity
in Ethiopia, p. 397, cited in Clapham, op cit., p. 145.
Jember, "A Case Study of the Health Component of
Kebelle 41", cited in Clapham, op cit., p. 145.
Faught, op cit., pp. iii/iv.
Clapham, op cit., p. 175.
Mengistu Haile Mariam, Address to the National
Shengo, September 1987, cited in Clapham o>p cit p
176.
,
., .
Dr. Daniel Teferrra, "Performance of Ethiopia's Socialist
Economy", paper prepared for A Discussion Roundtable
on Ethiopia, Orkand Corporation, November 99, 1989.
Clapham, op cit., pp. 174-179, offers an excellent analysis of the villagization program.
"Orga~izat~onal ~tatement" issued by the Tigray
People~ L1~erat1on Front, Voice of the Tigray
Revolution m Amharic to Ethiopia 0400 GMT 21
October 89, FBIS-AFR-89-204, 24 October 1989.
"Orga_niz~tion~l Statement" issued by the Tigray
Peoples L1berat10n Front, op cit.
Programme of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary ·
Democratic Front, op cit.
For example, a TPLF spokesman in Washington recently told the writer that while it has a Marxist-Leninist
party organization, the TPLF does not believe in trying
to ~PP_ly Marxist-Leninist agricultural policies to
Eth10pia. :8e argued that individual farming and free
market pnces are the only way to stimulate agricultural
production.
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CENTRAL AMERICA:
LEARNING FROM THE LEGACY
By Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth E. Sharpe*

I

INTRODUCTION
Ronald Reagan's entry into the White House signaled,
in Arthur Schlesinger's words, "the seizure of foreign policy by
a boarding party of ideologies." 1 Despite some moves toward
pragmatism-in international economics and trade, European
affairs and nuclear arms negotizations, he kept Latin
American foreign policy largely in the hands of anti-communist
zealots-moral messianists who eschewed pragmatism and
realism. Areas of relatively minor priority, like Nicaragua,
were suddenly blown up into major issues around which there
was little rational debate about national interest or policy
effectiveness.2 Meanwhile, truly serious problems, like the
threat unmanageable debt poses to development and democracy in countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico received
scant attention.
The opportunities for the new Bush administration to
readjust priorities and formulate wise policies were enhanced by
changing conditions in the region. The commitment to regional
solutions by important actors like Mexico and Venezuela, and by
the Central Americans themselves, has increased the possibility
for peaceful settlement to long-standing conflicts. Changes in
Soviet foreign policy have created possibilities to further minimize the insertion of East-West issues in what have been primarily internal regional conflicts.
Back in the U.S., the bitterness and rancor generated
*Morris J. Blachman is associate director of the Institute of
International Studies at the University of South Carolina (Columbia). He has
done extensive fieldwork and writing on U.S. foreign policy in Central America.
Kenneth E. Sharpe is professor of political science at Swarthmore College. He
has written extensively on the political economy of Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean. Professors Blachman and Sharpe are the editors, with
,William- .M... LeoGrande (American University), of Confronting Reuolution:
Security Through Diplomacy in Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
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by Reagan's policies helped create a constituency for leaders
who would pursue peace and security through diplomacy, and
who would tackle difficult problems with honesty and clarity.
But forging new policies first demands an honest look
at a reality often distorted by rhetoric and hyperbole. Further,
both liberals and conservatives must face the difficult, hard to
accept, lessons of recent experience. Finally, policy makers
must be ready to confront quickly the domestic and regional
obstacles that could rapidly overwhelm the soundest of programs.
THE LEGACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

A decade of intense policy focus on Central America by
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations did little to alleviate the problems of war, underdevelopment, and abuse of
power the people in the region have faced.
El Salvador is still plagued by a costly civil war. The
Christian Democratic Government of Jose Napoleon Duarte,
long Washington's hope for a moderate, reformist alternative,
suffered serious erosion of support because of corruption. failure to deliver on promised reform, and inability to end the war.
Consequently, the Christian Democrats were so widely discredited that the ultra-rightist ARENA party won a majority of
seats in the March 1988 Assembly elections. Instead of pulling
together, the party factions fractured further which led to an
easy victory for ARENA in the 1989 presidential elections.
Political groups on the left, including the FDR, an ally of the
guerrilla FMLN, played a modest role in the elections, but
harassment, repression, intimidation and impeded access to
full participation kept them from mounting a serious challenge. The insistence of these groups on a negotiated solution
to the civil war was perceived as a severe threat to the military
and the right, whose tolerance for such dissent is severely limited. Meanwhile, moderate and Jeft leaning labor and peasant
organizations began discussing how to coordinate their resistance to the increased .repression they had forecast would
42
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accompany an ARENA victory. U.S. policy now confronts an El
Salvador with continuing polarization, a no win military situation, and increasing repression by an ultra rightist government
whose leaders have been closely associated with death squad
activities and whose programs represent an oligarchic reaction
. to the mild reforms of the Duarte era.
In Guatemala, efforts by Christian Democratic
· President Vinicio Cerezo to check military abuses of power,
open dialogue with insurgent forces and push reforms, triggered a May 1988 coup by hard-line military officers strongly
supported by reactionary business elites. It failed to overthrow
the government, but it marked the end of any likelihood that
the military would allow a genuine reformist civilian government to take power, not just office. While labor and peasant
organizations have continued their efforts to reorganize-they
were decimated in the early 1980's by military repression, continued death squad activities, an attack which forced the closing of the leftist opposition magazine La Epoca, and government timidity on reforms, all indicative of the power and determination of the coup supporters to maintain control.
Honduras continues to be in difficult economic straits
and is kept afloat by infusions of U.S. aid. Political and press
freedom remain far greater in its northern neighbors, but elections have neither led to reform nor weakened the control of a
corrupt military; and there has been some evidence of deep
involvement in narcotics trafficking amongst high officers.
What's more, there is growing resentment about the pro-consul
attitude of the U.S. The failure of the police to respond for two
and a half hours to the April 1988 anti-U.S. riots which burned
the Embassy annex, indicates how deeply the resentment had
spread into the military itself. The military and most other sectors are deeply worried that the presence of the contra force, or
its remnants, in Honduras could spawn marauding bandits
who would be a destablizing force for years to come.
In Costa Rica, the only stable ~emocracy in the region,
the U.S. had been at loggerheads with the government of
Oscar Arias because of his refusal to support the contra policy.
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Actions against that government-forcing out the Costa Rican
Ambassador for "lobbying" Congress against the contra policy,
for example--slowly chilled relations with a government, that
by all of Washington's policy pronouncements, the U.S. should
be fully backing in the region.
And in Nicaragua the contra policy not only sacrificed
p_eace fo_r war and undermined development programs, but by
further mserting East-West issues into the conflict, the U.S., in
effect, encouraged the Nicaraguans to militarize, to seek
increased Soviet arms shipments, and to maintain the presence of Cuban Advisors. Nicaragua successfully contained the
contras militarily, but the war (which, at times, absorbed up to
62% of the national budget) so deepened economic problems
that stabilization became the government's number one priority. Major stabilization and adjustment programs initially instituted in February and June of 1988 placed a renewed emphasis on Market principles and accepted stiff IMF type medicine
(without IMF monetary support). Though the Sandinistas continued staunchly to resist efforts to force or negotiate them out
of power, they have backed regional peace efforts that recognized their legitimacy, such as the Esquipulas II accords signed
by the five Central American presidents in August 1987. This
agreement, plus official concern to ease economic pressures
and restart reform programs, spurred a major policy change in
early 1988 when the Sandinistas agreed to negotiate directly
with the contras leading to cease fire accords signed in Sapoa
in March 1988. The recent Tela accords which the Sandinistas
signed set into motion a potential process for demobilizing the
contras, holding another round of presidential elections and
· beginning the long road to reconstruction of Nicaragua's devastated economy. Much of its success depends on the degree to
which the U.S. becomes a serious supporter of the efforts of the
Central Americans to use diplomacy and to resolve their problems themselves.
Meanwhile our major regional and European allies
have seen the U.S. as scuttling attempts to negotiate peace
and security agreements. Time and again countries like
44
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Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, and the five presidents of Central America, have said that the situation continues to deteriorate because the United States follows a policy
based on military not political solutions to the conflicts in the
region. Their efforts to create alternatives have provided the
United States with a number of opportunities to forge a new
.partnership in the region, to add our great influence and
strength to their leverage in creating a situation which will
serve our national interests, and theirs. Such an opportunity
faces the Bush Administration, but seizing this opportunity
first demands we learn some important lessons based on the
recent experience in Central America.

LESSONS
Central America has long occupied a "special" place in
American foreign policy. As President Calvin Coolidge stated in
April 1927, "Toward the governments of countries ... this side of
Panama we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to
other nations." It was left to his Undersecretary of State to
make clear just what this "moral responsibility" meant: "We do
control the destinies of Central America and we do so for the
simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates
such a course. "3
For over 40 years now, our principal efforts to "control
the destinies" have been designed to prevent or reverse leftist
revolutions.4 Many policy makers have simply assumed that
any such revolutions are tantamount to a Soviet penetration of
our border, threatening our vital national interest. The "loss"
of Cuba, even more than the "loss" of China, became the symbol of the danger, of lost prestige, and for inoculating "never again" into the national political psyche.
Conservatives, mostly Republicans, argued that the primary cause of upheaval was, as John Foster Dulles put
it," alien intrigue and treachery," a danger "originating outside
the hemisphere." They put forth policies relying primarily on
force to eliminate the turmoil and establish order. Liberals,.
45
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mostly Democrats, claimed the primary cause was p~verty,
inequality, and repression-exacerbated, perhaps by the
Soviets or their allies. They recommended political pressure
and economic assistance to undermine revolution from below
by bringing about reform from above. Both sides perceived
themselves as helping the anti-Communist-and therefore presumed to be democratic-forces, and they bristled when
charged with "intervening" or attempting to "control internal
affairs." But such policies inevitably involved the U.S. in managing the internal affairs of these countries to prevent revolution. 5 In practice, each administration's policies have been a
mix of conservative and liberal policies. Eisenhower, Nixon and
Reagan emphasized the former: Kennedy, J~hnson and Carter,
the latter.
The past ten years of U.S. policy toward Central
America demonstrate that both approaches are seriously
flawed, and mixing them together can create a costly, contradictory and counterproductive concoction. They teach us
lessons about the causes of, and threat posed by, revolution;
the efficacy of methods we use to combat revolution-rollback
and containment mixed with economic assistance; the effectiveness of mu~tilateral diplomacy for resolving the crisis; and
finally, about the domestic consequences of our foreign policy.
1. Nationalism outweighs internationalism in leftist rev·
olutionary regimes.
This is an old lesson, already appreciated in U.S. relations with countries like Yugoslavia and China. But it could be
learned again from the Nicaraguan experience: the
Sandinistas are far more Nicaraguan than they are Soviet or
Cuban, their Marxist rhetoric notwithstanding. Policy makers
have sometimes not been able to see this lesson, because they
wrongly assume that public doctrine is a more reliable indicator of a regime's character than its behavior. The economic
models they have followed, for all their failures, have not been
replicas (and were often rejections) of Soviet or Cuban ones:
their reliance on cooperative and private, not state farms; their
46
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mixed economy which left the majority ofland and indus.tIJ: in
private hands; the institut~o~s they cr~ate~ .for negotiat~ng
with private growers assoc1at1ons. Their wrllmgness to sign
verifiable security agreements with the U.S., including
removal of foreign advisors, limits on arms acquisitions, and
.guarantees of no foreign military bases is another indication.
Concrete efforts to reduce border tensions, minimize fears of
·aggression, and establish reasonable economic rela~ions with
their neighbors belie the "inevitability" of commumst expan·
sionism assumed by those who by focusing on doctrinaire interpretations of ideology do not see the nationalistic behavior.6

2. Internal conditions of inequity and repression are far
more fundamental in causing and sustaining revolu·
tions than external support.
The guerrilla war did not begin in El Salvador because
of external support; and after ten years of stalemate there is no
evidence that external assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua, or the
Soviet Union is a major factor. (Which is not to say that there
is not external financing or assistance). Far more inrportant in
sustaining the civil war has been the unwillingness of the
Salvadoran military and government to bring about significant
reform and end repression. It has not been possible for the best
intentioned moderates---here or in Central America-to engineer reform from above in order to pre-empt revolution from
below. The power and recalcitrance of the military and economic elites who control the mechanisms of repression and
institutions which most need reform has simply been too great.
What's more, they have learned to adapt to external pressures
without ceding basic controJ.7
3. Arming exiles to "rollback" revolutionary regimes is a
counterproductive and costly policy.
The failure in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs should have served
as an early warning: if a revolution is popular internally and
strong organizationally, an exile army is not going to generate an
uprising. In Nicaragua, despite internal opposition, the
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Sandinistas enjoyed substantial support, where well organized,
and had important European, Latin American and Soviet bloc
SUJ?port. On the other hand, the initial role of Somocistas, the
reliance. on ruthless attacks against civilians, and the obvious
subservience of the contras to Reagan Administration policy
prevented the translation of domestic hardships or disaffection
with the Sandinistas into contra support.
Moreover, the rollback policy has been costly in terms of
U.S. interests. It encouraged a closing of political space within
Nicaragua; led to border tensions with Honduras and strengthened the military there against its civilian government; disrupted regional trade and discouraged investment, both important to the economic recovery of the whole region; undermined
our moral authority and credibility in Latin America and
Europe; and at home in the U.S., it not only encouraged rancor
and division, but diverted attention from dealing with other
really important issues in Mexico and South America. As
Oscar Arias pointed out, "you must remember, it is easy to convert your best friends into your worst enemies." The U.S.
should, he said," concentrate on a dialogue with us-not the
use of force."
4. Aid to local militaries fails to provide a shield for
reform, eliminate the root causes of revolution or defeat
the insurgency.
In El Salvador, despite massive aid and counterinsurgency training for the military, the evidence of the past
decade confirms a March, 1987 study by four U.S. lieutenant
colonels at Harvard's JFK School of Government. "The
FMLN-tough, competent, highly motivated-can sustain its
current strategy indefinitely. The Salvadorans have yet to
devise a persuasive formula for wining the war.... the war in El
Salvador is stuck; unhappily the United States finds itself
stuck with the war." The recent insurrection proved this point
once again.
The carrot of U.S. aid was sufficient to bring about elections that initially put Christian Democratic reformer Duarte
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into office, but it could not put him in power. U.S. pressure got
the Salvadoran military to reduce murder by death squads, but
present as well as past arbitrary arrest, detention without
trial, torture, and disappearance of labor and peasant leaders
continue unabated and goes unpunished-50,000 noncombatants have been murdered without a single member of the
Salvadoran security forces ever having been tried, much less
convicted or incarcerated, for these killings. Despite U.S. aid,
the police forces are part of the problem and the judiciary, so
intimidated by threats and even assassination, has been paralyzed. Consequently, these actions continue with impunity,
reinforcing the traditional cycle of repression followed by reaction followed by more repression. Efforts at genuine reform are
thus severely restricted, whether seeking political negotiations
to end the war, improved salaries and wages, credit and technical assistance for land reform, or a diversion of expenditures
from war to development.
The Guatemalan military has been able to contain, not
defeat, the insurgency there. The techniques it used-eliminating reformers in parties, unions and peasant organizations;
killing Indians in the highlands, on whom the guerrillas
depended for support; forcing tens of thousands to take refuge
in Mexico or in military controlled "model villages"-allowed it
to create a cemetery-like peace. But years of U.S. aid did little
to change the internal conditions or help break the cycle of
repression, reactions, repression. Today important elements in
the military, together with a powerful, recalcitrant private sector are still able to block the reform efforts of President
'
.
Cerezo. As Cerezo enters the final months of his term, the
repression has been increasing once again.
5. Mixing economic aid with rollback and containment
policies contributes more to prosecution of hostilities
than to needed structural reforms and economic development.
The U.S. bankrolls El Salvador. The $608 million we
49
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provided in 1988 was 105% of what the Salvadorans themselves contributed for the governmental budget. U.S. dollars do
precious little to address the need to reform the root causes of
the war: 75% of U.S. aid went either to fight the war or to
repair its effects. As long as a large military has to be supported, the infrastructure and harvests are destroyed, and capital
flight continues relatively unabated, resources will inevitably
be diverted to finance the war effort. The experience of these
past several years has confirmed the argument made in the
Kissinger Commission Report that economic development and
progress require peace first. B
Economic development is difficult to attain even under
the best of circumstances. Economic assistance, such as the
Alliance for Progress, helped stimulate rapid export led growth
in the 1950-1980 period. But, its effect was to force thousands
of small farmers off the land to make way for large, commercial farms; create widespread unemployment; swell already
overcrowded urban slums; and create higher prices for basic
food stuffs. The rigid, highly skewed social structure and lack
of government commitment to reform meant the benefits of
growth did not trickle down. Instead, those conditions spurred
movements for reform which, when they were repressed, shifted to revolution. A policy that simply "throws money" at problems of poverty, independent of the character of the regime, is
naive, wasteful and potentially dangerous. It may support
growth that leads only to armed insurrection and strengthen
the power of exactly those elites that oppose broadly shared
development.
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Esquipulas in August 1987, and the cease fire accord th!s
spawned between the contras and the Sandinistas at Sapoa m
March of 1988, created far more positive changes in terms of
peace and political openings in Nicaragua, than years of contra
war. The acceptance of the Tela agreement was yet .ai~other
indication that the Sandinista Governme~t. was willm?" to
respond to political opportunity, not military coerc10n.
Although success in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador
have been far more limited, the Esquipulas a".c?r~s have
strengthened internal forces that backed reconciliation and
reform and opened some possibilities for refugees to return.
'While it is never publicly admitted, there see~s to be a
presumption in the U.S. that lesser develo~ed and ~mpove~
ished nations do not produce intellect_ually agile an~ d~plomati
cally astute individuals. But the delivery of negotiat10ns that
have taken place over the last ten year~ b'.l~e this b.elief. The
Central Americans understand the viability .of diplomacy.
Costa Rica has negotiated a border agreement with ~icaragua,
and an information arrangement operates to deal with bo~~er
tensions between Honduras and Nicaragua. Indeed, .the ability
to orchestrate the Equipulas and Tela agreements m the fa".e
of the pressures coming from th~ _D.S. is. ~ test~ment ~ their
concern and competence for deVIsmg pohtical/diplomatic solutions to the problems in the region.
. ..
What they lack-resources and technical .capabilities to
organize monitoring groups, verification commissions an~ so
on, could be provided with the help of the OAS. and the Umted
States. But, as Central American leaders .will tell you, the
major obstacle to effective regional diplomatic efforts has been
the lack of genuine support from the U.S.9

6. Multilateral diplomacy often works far better than
unilateral force.in securing U.S. interests.
The record on Nicaragua is clear; there is a direct correlation between political and multilateral initiatives and the
opening of political space in the country. Conversely, military
pressure over the past decade has tended to lead to a closing of
political space and a tightening of restrictions by the
Sandinistas. The agreements of the five presidents at

7. Pursing an unpopular, interventionist strategy
abroad is damaging to the institutions of our own constitutional democracy here at home.
.
This lesson, only partially lefi:rned f7om the Vietnam
experience was brought to the fore once agam when the IranContra sc~dal broke. It was opposition to the contra war that
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Both the conservatives and the liberals find some
lessons easier to learn than others. The liberals understand
the failures of rollback and the damaging consequences of aid
to repressive militaries; conservatives easily learn the lessons
about the failures of economic aid and political pressure to prevent revolutions. But it is very difficult for either side to learn
all the lessons. If a particular blend of carrots and sticks economic aid and military assistance, elections and counterinsurgency, human rights and free fire zones, diplomatic pressures and contra aid- does not work either to create democracy and reform, or prevent revolutions, or eliminate leftist
governments then both sides assume that we must simply
readjust the ingredients in the recipe. Because the United
States still has such tremendous military and economic influence in the region it is hard to learn that the old dictim is not
longer (if it ever was) applicable: we can not control the internal destinies of these countries.10 Both sides see this as simple
"giving up" on U.S. interests. Since this is clearly unacceptable
to them, the debate erroneously returns to what proportions to
mix together.
What is ignored, then, is the most important and difficult lesson to learn: Giving up control over internal affairs does
not mean abandoning U.S. interests; quite the contrary, it
would allow us to promote real US interests more effectively.11
Take, for example, security interests. We must prevent
the Soviet Union from using Central America to threaten the
United States militarily. The stationing of Soviet missiles there
would be as unacceptable now as it was in 1962, when the

Soviets sought to place missiles in Cuba. There is no public evi-.
dence that using Central America this way has ever been an
intention of the Soviets. Aside from their intentions, however,
the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
.Union make that kind of offensive move less and less likely
eacli day.
·
It is also important for the United States to assure
access to the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea lanes. But
we could far more effectively protect these interest if we
stopped mucking around trying to destabilize the Sandinistas
and trying to manage El Salvador's internal affairs and,
instead, dealt directly with the Soviets. Washington must
make clear that we would respond with overwhelming force if
such actions were threatened, in effect extending to the entire
region the kind of understanding prohibiting the stationing of
strategic weapons, worked out between President Kennedy
and the Soviets over Cuba, and later reaffirmed by the Nixon
administration.
We also have a strong interest in encouraging regional
peace. Current regional conflicts disrupt growth, divert funds
for investment and reform into military expenditures, increase
unemployment and poverty, and displace tens of thousands of
people. The U.S. feels the impact directly in terms of increased
immigration pressures. Such conflicts also heighten border
tensions and threaten to spill over into regional war which
would jeopardize trade and investment.
Yet the very attempts to destabilize the Nicaraguan
government have resulted in intensifying such regional conflicts and clocking promising peace accords. The Sandinista's
nationalist concern with internal development already makes
aggression by them highly unlikely, as does the widespread·
understanding that such action would bring a disastrous military confrontation with the United States. If there were incllcations of hostile intentions (incidents have occurred in the past,
such as the 1969 Honduran-Salvadoran "soccer war") we
could most effectively discourage or stop them by working
within the collective security arrangements of the Rio Treaty:
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led high administration officials to lie, break the law, circumvent Congress, and privatize foreign policy making in their
efforts to keep the contra war alive. Because it is costly to pursue such interventionist strategies (in terms of U.S. lives) it is
likely that strong opposition will continue and so will the risks
to democracy here at home.
FORGING A NEW POLICY
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that would bring to bear multilateral pressures (to which all
the_ coun_tries, ~eluding Nicaragua, are very sensitive) incorporatmg diplomatic and economic sanctions and force if necessary. Similarly, concerns about significan't support for insurgents in neighboring countries-if there were credible evidence7ould be taken to the OAS and handled through the
appropriate clauses of the Rio Treaty, and multilateral sanctions sought to halt that aid. Insistence on controlling
Nicaraguan politics has discouraged Washington from testing
Managua's offers to negotiate verifiable agreements to assure
that no arms flow out of Nicaragua through Honduras to EI
Salvador, or flow through Honduran based contras back into
Nicaragua.
In short, the potentially disruptive foreign actions of
Central American countries can much more effectively be handled by dealin~ direct!?' :Mth the behavior. Putting U.S. energy
and resource~ mto dec1dmg what kind of government a country
should have lS not only costly, but may actually undermine our
interests in regional peace.
U.S. economic interests in Central America are relatively modest--the region does not provide us with any strategic
'.esource~. Howeve7 the U.S.'s interest in peace does imply an
mterest m promotmg broadly shared, equitable development:
hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease create justifiable
causes for discontent and demands to redress the situation.
Further, such problems intensify pressures for northward
migration, and should themselves be a concern to a country
that values human life and dignity. But ironically, there are a
number of ways in which the effort to manage internal affairs
undermines such equitable development.
. For examp~e, the necessary condition for such development is some modicum of regional peace; but U.S. insistence on
k~eping, or getting, the left out of power in EI Salvador and
Nicaragua has blocked efforts at negotiating a reduction in
c?nfli~t. The continued war has simply eaten up U.S. economic
aid "."1th few developmental results. Further, the efforts to control mternal conflicts have often led the U.S. to ally itself with
.54

military and economic elites that oppose needed reforms so the
effort to help "guarantee stability" undermines the possibility
for broadly shared development. The U.S. may initially insist
on reform as a condition for aid, but when electoral fraud,
harassment and violence leads would be reformers to turn to
·demonstrations, sit-ins, land seizures and even armed insur. gency, control of these disruptive elements generally becomes
primary. U.S. interests in long term peace and development
demand living with a certain amount of disruption and conflict
in the region instead of rushing to aid reactionary forces.
Development itself is unlikely to be broadly shared
unless the citizens of each country are organized to demand
reform and can participate in the planning and administration
of development programs. Long term peace is unlikely if military, political, or economic elites repress such reform efforts.
But the presumption of control actually undermines U.S.
efforts to promote real democracy. Although the term "democratization" has recently been distorted and devalued by many
conservatives to justify aid for contra forces and the
Salvadoran military, the United States does have an interest
in promoting democracy.12
Liberals anxious to keep revolutionaries out of power
may initially favor democracy. They understand that an end to
repression, and popular participation moderate the pressures
for revolution. But if reactionary military and economic elites
will not open up the process (eg. are not willing to give elected
reformers power) and revolution is threatened, the overriding
desire to establish and maintain order often leads to a redefining of democracy-relying heavily on formalistic criteria like
the mere holding of elections-so as to justify military and economic aid. Further, there is a temptation to hush up our concerns with more basic conditions that eventually could promote
democracy-the right to organize and demonstrate, the protection of dissidents and of a free press, respect for fundamental
human rights-because making a fuss about these things
would highlight the face of repression and undermine support
for aid .
55
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The U.S. must not give up on promoting real democracy,
but we do need to learn that this is not a problem of "better
~anag?ment": or more skillfu~ly blending carrots and sticks.
n the immediate future, the history and conditions, for exampl~, ?f El Salvador and Guatemala, make democracy an unrealistic and unattainable goal: the U.S. does not have that kind
of power. Judging the success of policies by their ability to achieve. demo:racy-making "democratization" the central goal
of poh~y-will create a gap between expectation and rarity
that_ ~i.11 needlessly undermine domestic and international
credibility. Worse, it may blind us to the relatively more modest. steps that could be taken to encourage those conditions
which som~day_may make democracy more likely: speaking up
for th_ose imprisoned or tortured or censored; publicly conde~~g, and refusing to aid, governments (independent of
their ideolo!lY) that engage in gross and systematic violations
of human nghts; and ';orking with other countries to support
the e~ort:i of human nghts monitors and international rights
organizations.
The focus on getting or keeping the left out of power
hampers our encouragement of development and democracy in
an even more subtle way: it is only when internal turmoil raises th? spectra of revolution that the U.S. pays attention to
~uch issues. When order is restored, our concern shifts. What
is forgotten is that long term U.S. security interests are best
served by having neighboring countries whose citizens feel
sec.ure, ha_ve. decent_ life chances, and are not repressed. ·
N~ither bmld~g bamers of containment nor rolling back the
alien hordes gives as much security as building a good neighborhood. Ye_t t~e short t.:rm focus on maintaining control in an
effort to ehmma~e a misconceived and overinflated security
~hreat, ac.tually discourages U.S. policy makers from formulat~g the _kmds of multil~teral, long term efforts-for encouragmg ~egional tra~e, easmg the debt burden, resolving armed
conflicts, promoting human rights-that might encourage the
development and decency that would constitute a foundation
for durable peace and real security.
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When American policy makers learn that they do not
have to take responsibility for managing the internal affairs of
Central America in order to pursue U.S. interests, they can put
forward sound and reasonable policies.13 'lb minimize Soviet
military influence in the region, diminish any threat that these
. countries might pose to each other or to us, and promote peace,
economic recovery, and real democracy we could adopt the following policy guidelines:
1. De-escalate superpower rivalry in the region.
Minimizing this East-West component means working to eliminate the dependence of local forces on either the Soviet Union
or the United States for external military support. The primary responsibility for tl!is lies with the U.S., because it is the
primary "East-West" actor in Central America.
2. De-militarize the region. That means finding ways to
limit the regional arms race, keeping advance weaponry (particularly aircraft and missiles) out of the region, encouraging
the build-down of armed forces, assisting with mechanisms to
minimize the cross border flows of arms shipments to insurgents in neighboring countries, and looking to develop alternative, non-violent mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts.
3. End all support for illegal mercenary activity. That
means not only ending direct military aid for the contras, but
ending the entire contra-type policy-the CIA intelligence and
logistics support, the funneling of aid through third countries
or private sources, the non-lethal military aid. That also means
shouldering our responsibility to find a decent and humane
way to resettle these exiles in Nicaragua or elsewhere, and
help neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica with the associated
refugee problems. To do less would be to leave in place armed
bands that could wreak havoc on the region for years.

4. Promote broadly shared development. That means
working to restore regional trade, encourage U.S. Central
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American trade, and promote mechanisms of debt relief that
will free up national funds for investment and reform, not simply to make interest payments on debts. But it means more
than promoting growth. It also means encouraging efforts at
struc~al reform--land reform, for example, and programs in
e~ucation, health, and housing-that will more equitably distribute the benefits of growth to the majority of the population.
Such reforms will inevitably be turbulent and conflictual, and
must not lead to the panicky or knee-jerk responses of the past
which resulted in destroying them and providing the oligarchy
and military with the tools to reinforce their dominant political, economic and social position.
5. Promote the strengthening of democratic institutions, values and practices. That means more than
~imply encouraging the election of civilians. It means promotmg the full political participation of all non-violent groups and
parties, of the right, center, and left; championing protection of
press freedom not only from censorship but from officially tolerated .or supported violence against it; and encouraging the
protection of party and union activists, human rights monitors,
and election officials from threats, disappearances, arrests and
torture.
6. Re-establish the primacy of diplomacy, ·negotiated
settlements, and promote multilateral approaches to
regional problems. Multilateral does not mean inviting other
countries to lend support for plans the U.S. has formulated. It
means a true partnership with regional allies. And an emphasis on diplomacy does not mean eschewing force as an instrument of!ast resort in instances where there is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. But it does
mean recognizing diplomacy and cooperation as the first
resort, and understanding that negotiated solutions are far
more effective and lasting than ones imposed by force.
Concretely, it means throwing the full weight of the U.S.
behind regional efforts to promote peace, and taking steps to

promote a political settlement to end all regional conflicts.

IMPLEMENTING A NEW POLICY:
OVERCOMING THE ROADBLOCKS
The Bush Administration can and sho.uld ~ove q1:'ickly
to implement policies based on these gmdelmes. Firmly
putting forward concrete measures to reduce super-power
rivalry and de-escalate conflicts wo.ul~ go a long ~ay toward
diffusing irrational fears and convmcmg the pubhc that the
administration understands, and can deal wit~'. ~ea! thr~ats
and promote real security. A first step wo_uld be mitiating bda~
eral discussions with Nicaragua to negotiate all ~utual secunty concerns. It should be possible to make rapid. progr~~s on
reaching verifiable agreements prohi~i.ting fore.ign rmhtary
bases in Nicaragua, reducing foreign =!ita~ advisors ?n both
sides and setting up international momtonng mechamsms on
the Nicaragua-Honduran border to minimize cross border arms
flows and incursions.
Another step would be to throw fi~m U.~. support
behind regional peace efforts. This would q1:'ickly distan~e the
United States from responsibility for the mten;-al affairs of
Nicaragua, and perhaps even El Salvador; and it would provide a forum for encouraging a full peace agre7ment between
the contras and the Sandinistas as well as multilatt:ral mechanisms for dismantling the contra forces and resettling the soldiers and their families. The Esquipulas and Tela a~cords
might still form a basis for a regional effort, and other rmportant forces (Mexico, Venezuela, the Church, the OAS, C~ada
and some of our European allies). coul.d help ~reate a. regio~al
framework for resolving this conflict-if Washmgton signals its
strong support.
'bil"t
Policy makers could also quietly probe the possi_ 1 Y
for pursuing Gorbachev's original offer t? former. President
Reagan to negotiate reductions of arn;is shipments m th~ context of a regional settlement along the lines of the Esqmpulas
II accords. Taking such concrete steps would help remove the
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overemphasis on Cold War tensions in Central America and
allow attention to shift to the rest of Latin America where serious problems need urgent consideration.
S~rious problems would still remain, but the more they
are publicly defined for what they are-primarily regional
developmenta! problems? not East-West ones-the greater latitude there will be ~or implementing rational policies. Such
efforts, however, will also face important obstacles here at
ho~7: the U.S. does .not have a great capability to carry out
P?lic1~s that s~ heavily emphasize diplomacy, and new policy
directioi:s are likely to face vocal domestic opposition.
. . Smee 194'.7, t~e _D.S. has put massive sums of money into
buildi~g ai:d mamtammg its military capability. But, relatively
speak.mg, httle effort has been made to develop and maintain the
capac1~y to conduct diplomacy. The past nine years have been no
except1oi: to that t:7nd. When one considers how much money
"'.as put 1:1to ~h~ military and how little into beefing up the Foreign Service, it is not surprising to see the difference between the
overly abundant and sophisticated capabilities of the former and
the threadbase resources of the latter.
~he pro~lem of this "diplomacy gap" is all the greater as
th_e foreign affairs. n~eds have grown so much over these years,
~1th th~ dram~tic mcrease in the number of new nations,
issues, mtemat~onal organizations and conferences. Yet, the
U.S. has a fore1~ service which has not kept up. They are
understaffe~ and ~adequately trained. The system of rewards
and promotion, remforced by the foreign service subculture
conduces to conformism and mitigates against comprehensive'
carefully crafted, accurate and incisive reporting. This proble~
was .greatly ~x~.cerbated during the Reagan years when "supportmg the .lme was considered by many to be more important
than reportmg accurately.
Unfortunately, no better case exemplifies this than that
of Central America. Even before the Reagan administration took
~~~~'.the demand for ideological conformity was made clear A
~1t hst of am~assadors was developed and the new administ~a
tion purged Virtually the entire set of foreign service officers
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who· had Central American regional experience and replaced
them often with those whose principal service had been in
Southeast Asia or Soviet Bloc countries.
What is needed immediately in Central America is the
placement of skilled, highly competent foreign service officers
·thoroughly knowledgeable about the region. They must be
. given clear instructions that reporting should be an accurate
reflection of the reality on the ground in the region, and should
not be designed in accord with some preordained administration position back in Washington. And they ~ust be e'.11~w
ered to utilize their diplomatic skills in pursumg negotiations
and political settlements to the conflicts in the region.
There are often obstacles in the U.S. to this policy. One
problem is the deeply rooted assumption, so ingrained ~to the
national political psyche, that Americans are responsible for
managing the internal affairs of countries on its borders ~nd
preventing revolutions that have long been defined as equivalent to takeovers by hostile powers. This problem has been
heightened by both Reagan and Bush administration rhetoric
aimed at creating the image that continued Sandinista rule
threatens vital U.S. security interests.
Given this context, the administration needs to talk
calmly and honestly about Central American reality and U.S.
interests there. It needs to counter the conservative's obsession
with Central America by locating regional policies in the larger
context of new global and hemispheric policies. It is tinle to
take advantage of the Gorbachev era to wind down the cold
war and demilitarize regional conflicts. It is time to encourage
cooperative efforts to deal with pressing issues like spurring
growth at home and in Latin America, easing the burde?-~ of
debt, initiating reforms that relieve hunger and malnutnt1?n,
tackling international environmental problems, and copmg
with other sensitive problems such as migration and narcotics.
Certain factors favor this redefinition of the problem. A
majority of the U.S. public has consistently opposed the conservative's contra policy, and there is widespread suspicion that
the Reagan Administration was less than honest about its
61

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES

involvement in the region. There is also the atmosphere of
improving relations with the Soviet Union and evidence of a
Soviet commitment to reduce its interventionist role in the
Third World. Further, because the new policy demands less
control i~ is also less costly. It will be difficult to get
Congress10nal approval for regional economic aid or trade
arrangements in a time of deficits if the banner of anticommunism can no longer be waved. But the administration would
not be fanning the same rancorous flames that engulfed efforts
to get aid for the Salvadoran military before 1984, or the contras after 1984.
No amount of rational policy argument is likely to
change quickly an imperative that is so deeply ingrained.
Opponents of a new direction are only going to be convinced
that the U.S. should deal with the region in a new way when
they see that such policies actually work to enhance real
!nterests-and the sky does not fall when the U.S. stops trymg to control "destinies." But in order to implement these
policies and demonstrate that they can work, the administration must be prepared for a potential difficulty. Its best
efforts to put Central America on the back burner, and proceed cautiously and quietly so as not to inflame passions,
may face vocal, well organized opposition by conservatives
who have long made Central America a litmus test for a policy makers' political bonifides. Former administration offici~ls, :iiublic~y certified as experts by their long experience,
will likely mhabit conservative think tanks or join the
already quite conservative class of Washington pundits, and
may try to use these positions to make Central America a
"test" of the administration's willingness to be tough, stand
tall, and protect America.
Under such circumstances, the administration needs a
strong defense of its policies if it is not to suffer the same fate
that President Carter suffered when the right organized (in
groups like the Committee on the Present Danger) to block,
almost successfully, the Panama Canal treaties, to block the
Salt II treaty, and to blast his administration for allowing the
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hostage crisis and the defeat of Somoza by the Sandinistas.
The obstacles created by such right wing attacks co~!? be c?mpounded if some regional crisis engulfs the ad~mistrabon.
Although it is reasonable to be concerned about Nicaragua, the
events that might spark such a crisis-an unprovoked
·Sandinista renewal of the war or a really severe government
· crackdown-are not likely to occur. El Salvador, however, presents greater possibility for trouble.
PREPARING FOR ANOTHER SALVADORAN "SURPRISE"

Nine years ago, at the _Hm~ of .the last presidential
transition in this country, the situation m E.l Salvador exploded on the front pages and became the occasion for th~ Reagan
Administration to draw the line against commumsm a~d
defme the outlines of what proved to be an unsuccessful poli:y
toward the region. The current tense ~ituation could agam
rapidly deteriorate, triggering conservative dem~ds that the
administration do something about internal affairs there. If
policy makers are not prepared to deal with it, ~d ;espond
reflexively from old visions, they could get l~cked ~n m way.s
that made later extrication-let alone a reonentat10n of policy-difficult.
.
.
.
The current Salvadoran situation is bemg dnven by a
number of closely connected dynamics. The gue.rrill~s, stron~
militarily, are looking to take advan~.ge of detenorating ~ond1tions to improve their military pos1t10n and, short of vict~ry,
force serious negotiations with the armed forces. Meanwhil~,
the ultra right, organized around the ARENA .party, sees their
recent electoral victories as the chance to gam co~plete government control, dismantle reforms, and put. back m place the
anti-reformist oligarchic project they led until 1979. L~bor and
peasant organizations have been bracing for the reactions they
. d
. tin
The internal situation in El Salvador is etei::ora ~ as
land and other reforms are gutted and the repression agamst
labor and peasant organizations increases. Moderate, formerly

feE
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pro-Christian ·Democratic organizations, unsupported and
unprotected by the new government, have been moving to the
left and joining independent and leftist unions in widespread
demonstrations and protests.· The 'FMLN is likely to continue
to increase its military activity and strengthen links to the
urban movements.
AB the deterioration continues, the Salvadoran military,
conservatives in Congress, and some State Department,
Pentagon and CIA officials, will pressure the administration to
act quickly so as not to "lose another country." They are likely
to paint such a situation as a test case of administration "will"
and "toughness," overestimate the threat, and recommend
steps that will lock the administration into reaffirming support
for an ultra-rightist, and probably quite brutal, government.
How might the administration, faced with an elected
ultra-rightist government and a deteriorating internal situation, respond? It would need a policy that distances itself from
the ultra-rightist government while creating multilateral support for a negotiated solution. Such immediate steps might
include the following:
First, the U.S. could encourage regional actors with
good relations to the FDR/FMLN, ARENA and the military to
set up a framework, involving the best aspects of the
Esquipulas II and Tela accords and the Contadora process, to
help encourage internal reconciliation. The talks between the
current government aud the FMLN present a tremendous
opportunity for such an effort. AB of the present they have been
used by the ARENA Government more to posture than to negotiate. The Church, the OAS, and certain European countries,
as well as the Socialist International and the Christian
Democratic international could also play important roles in
bringing about a viable, though undoubtedly protracted, negotiation process. Strengthening such efforts would increase the
changes for a negotiated solution, and decrease the responsibility of the U.S. for a particular outcome in El Salvador.
Second, the U.S. could make clear to the Salvadoran
government that it does not think a military solution to the
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t conflict is either possible or desirable. The level. of
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cu~en

.
.

refugee resettlement.
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Third, the U.S. could send clear messages tot e .governth mili't
d the ARENA party that U.S. aid to El
ment
e
ary an
.
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Salv~dor is contingent on an end to human ng~ts a uses. .
Quickly putting into place the steps outlined abov'." mi~ht
to redefine the Salvadoran s1tuat10n
. . t t'
enable the a dmims ra ion
. .
d
nationally and internationally before there is another ~~sis, an
create some room for maneuver, but the pressure to o something" will still be very great. Policy makers must thus be preared to draw a very clear line, beyond which they wil~ n?t go to
protect the Salvadoran military and oligarchy, an~ to ms1st that
~negotiated solution is the only workable a!ternativ~.
The Bush administration has the opportumty to define,
· · I d ew policies for the hem1. .
d
skillfully realistic an prmcip e n
.
~
s here
deteriorating situation in El Salvador is no p1a~e or
.P
· b
dd
Immediate and careful preparation to
it to get ogge own. 14
.
f t
e with the potential crises could avoid .the da?-g".r o. ye
~ther administration fmding itself perenmally stickmg itself
to the Central American tar baby.
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